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In order to highlight the special characteristics of 
the religious, Soren Kierkegaard in the writings that 
he later characterized as "aesthe'tic" emphasized the 
distinction between the aesthetic,· ethical, and reli· 
gious spheres. To highlight the specificaUy ethical, I 
would like to suggest at the outset, . as a kind of 
heuristic device, that we temporarily utilize some-
thing like that Kierkegaardian distinction between 
the "three spheres". For in discussions of moral 
questions, very often issues of a religious and/or 
aesthetic nature - which are outside the scope of 
morality proper- are intermingled or confused with, 
or substituted for, moral arguments; so that it be· 
comes advisable beforehand, as far as possible, to 
eliminate considerations which are extrinsic to 
morality, and which can prevent us from coming to 
terms with the strictly ethical issues. The result 
should be not necessarily simplification but quite 
possibly clarification. 
With regard to liberty, for example, a religious in· 
terpretation is advanced by Kierkegaard according to 
which freedom is contradistinguished not from ne-
cessity but from sin. Liberty for the Christian is es-
sentially a state of grace and salvation, which may be 
concomitant to, and compatible with, political op-
pression or insuperable practical obstacles to per-
sonal development or activity. On the level of the 
aesthetic (in the wide sense), we find the common 
concept of liberty as the "ability to preserve one's 
nature and do what one likes without unnecessary 
obstacles," which receives elaboration as a philo· 
sophical theory in the work of Thomas Hobbes and 
others. Standing in the middle, as an example of a 
strictly moral approach to liberty, is Immanuel 
Kant's characterization of liberty as autonomy, the 
rational self-determination of persons coordinated 
into a kind of moral republic or "kingdom of ends." 
As we consider the case of conscientious objec-
tion, it seems evident that the extenuating factors 
and excusing circumstances which have justified 
conscientious objection in the United States have 
traditionally, and primarily, been of a religious na-
ture. The successful Arrierican Cl)ristian conscien-
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tious objector typically appeals to his denomination's 
pacifist interpretation of Gospel spirituality (as with 
Quakers), or to the complete independence of the 
"Kingdom of God" from secular authority (as with 
Jehovah's Witnesses). It is also possible for mainline 
Catholics and Protestants to appeal to their own 
pacifist interpretation, or to the interpretation of 
their faith subcommunity, as a justification for their 
stand vis a vis war. But it is remarkable that for both 
draft-board adjudicators and anti-draft appellants, 
specifically moral objections and arguments seem to 
be excluded by a kind of common consent. The ven-
erable hosts of utilitarians, deontologists, natural law 
theorists, etc. seem constrained to stand on the side· 
lines when it comes to actual, practical, personal 
confrontations with one's draft board. Possibly the 
reasons for this are primarily practical: A denomina-
tional connection, especially where an institution 
has a history of pacifism, can more readily be con-
firmed. Long-standing active membership in a reli-
gious congregation gives credibility to an anti-war 
position taken by a draftee. But surely religiously 
motivated pacifism is not the only or the main rea-
son for refusing to participate in a war. 
Are there any powerful, persuasive and germane 
arguments of a purely moral nature sufficiently prac-
tical and applicable to serve to exonerate an individ-
ual from military combat service? In addressing this 
question, we must first distinguish between ap-
proaches which emphasize a subjective decision-pro-
cedure - e.g., the negative Golden Rule that one 
should not choose to do anything to anyone that he 
would be unwilling for that person to do to him -
from approaches which are based on ostensibly more 
objective considerations. Prima facie it would seem 
that an objective norm such as "natural law," if it · 
could point to certain hard and publicly ascertainable 
facts which are also indisputably common values, 
would be a solid buttress against the welter of coun-
terpoised "facts" that any government can muster up 
in justifying mobilization and war and the drafting of 
recruits for war. 
Natural law has at certain historical confluences 
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been simply identified with the positive law- e.g., 
the "natural law" of subjection of slaves to masters 
in eras when slavery was officially condoned, or the 
"natural'' domination of husband over wife. But it 
has also been at times the indispensable socio-politi· 
cal lever for transcending the oppression of positive 
laws. For example, the natural law that government 
should exist for the sake of, and/or with the consent 
of, the people governed has been the means of justi-
fying and instigating the overthrow of tyrannies. 
One question is this: Can an appeal to natural law be 
effective in that particular species of oppression in 
which an individual is being constrained unjustly to 
fight in a war, or constrained to fight in an unjust 
war, or constrained by a government to fight in any 
war in a context wherein no war can conceivably be 
justified? 
An initial elimination of one approach seems fea-
sible: When it comes to conscientious objection, it 
seems that an appeal to the law of "killing only for 
self-defense" would be, in the last analysis, too in· 
conclusive. Such an imposing array of actual ot po-
tential hostile jntentions exist in the international 
arena that a protective or suspicious government can · 
always argue ·forcibly that it is fighting a war of self-
defense, or initiating a preemptive war to obviate 
the necessity of defending against inevitable and im-
minent aggression, or fighting not against specifically 
military aggression but against, say, economic ag-
gression which has the potential of destroying its 
subsistence as a nation. In our current geopolitical 
context, a third-world nation might justify a preemp-
tive attack on another nation on the grounds of dis-
tribution inequities resulting from Western "greed," 
or on the basis of a conjectured future blockade of 
exports or imports. 
As one considers the applicability of natural law 
theory to the issue in question, a hurdle that pre-
sents itself is the well-known lack of consensus even 
among practitioners of natural law themselves, as to 
which concept of "nature" and/ or "natural law" an 
appeal should be made. Some would even be satis-
fied with the absolutely vague and completely in-
nocuous principle of synderesis, "good is to be done 
and evil is to be avoided" -a tenet highly unlikely to 
move any hearts at the military conscription estab-
lishments! Faced with this de'facto lack of consen-
sus, I would like to suggest in the interim (while 
pathfinders are still searching for some path to con-
sensus) that two somewhat specific tenets of tradi-
tional natural law theories (certainly more specific 
than synderesis) are eminently applicable to the 
issue of conscientious objection:-
1) The concept of universal human brotherhood 
(characteristic especially of the stoicism of Epicte-
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tus), which relativizes all struggles of ascendancy of 
one national, political, ethnic, or religious group . 
over another, and disallows any thought of annihilat· 
ing, or even subjugating, any group, is inherently in· 
compatible with wars which aim at such subordina· 
tion or annihilation. (The recent "Eve" hypothesis 
concerning the descent of the species from a single 
woman gives genetic substantiation to this concept; 
and the Treaty on Genocide, recently and belatedly 
ratified by the American Congress, might be taken 
as the final practical recognition of this principle in 
the sphere of contemporary international law.) Cases 
in point might be wars or campaigns directed against 
Kurds, Jews, Palestinians, Hindus, Moslems, Bosni· 
ans, Croats, Iraqis or Iranians. And in the past, 
American intervention in Vietnam to orchestrate the 
victory of one political faction over the other would 
have been objectionable for similar reasons, unless it 
could have been shown that one of the factions had 
been aiming at the forcible extermination of the 
other. 
2) The law of self-preservation, universally taken 
for granted and almost a truism, receives particular 
emphasis in the Thomistic version of natural law, 
which emphasizes the teleology of all natural beings 
toward maintaining and fostering their existence. In 
previous times, this law would not have been of 
paramount importance for conscientious objection, 
because war was considered a major, last-resort 
means of self-preservation for a political entity. But 
now the issue has become more precisely an issue 
of self-preservation against a species of war itself, 
that is, against nuclear war; since nuclear war, at a 
certain level of firepower, and in probable conjunc· 
tion with a "nuclear winter," has the potential of 
annihilating the human species, as well as all other 
species of life on the planet. And since at present 
even a limited or regional war could conceivably ex· 
pand (as has happened in the past) irito a worldwide 
conflagration, war used by past generations as an in-
strument for the resolution of conflicts must be 
viewed by the present generation as a quaint lux-
ury. With the widespread recognition of such possi-
bilities and of such dangers in the last decade, a 
timely appeal to the fundamental and ineluctable 
law of self-preservation of the species, and of all the 
nationalities or peoples encompassed by the species, 
should be both credible and powerful. 
... 
With deference to those who are anxious to avoid 
"naturalistic fallacies," we might observe that both 
the above-mentioned laws - the law of allegiance to 
the human species as a whole and the law of self-
preservation - are not only facts of existence and 
continued existence but also are values, recognized 
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as commendable and rational at least in theory if not 
always in practice by the vast majority of peoples of 
the world. It is not this convergence of fact and 
value which should be considered paradoxical, but 
rather the artificial separation of fact from value in 
the first place (which has instigated in philosophical 
discourse a multiplication of specious and rhetorical 
"naturalistic fallacies") . 
indeed for millenia, a new and an emphatically per· 
suasive force in the present era. 
With a view to possible allegations of "objec· 
tivism," it should also be observed that the appeals 
made both to universal brotherhood and to species· 
self-preservation do give due respect to the-elements 
of subjectivity and historicity. It is precisely human 
social and political and technological evolution that 
gives these long-standing natural laws, recognized 
One cannot, of course, predict how persuasive 
such arguments from natural law might be to the 
various concrete officials an individual conscien· 
tious objector might have to deal with. But possibly 
we have now sufficiently transcended our long· 
standing ignorance of the terminal consequences 
and side-effects of nuclear attacks, and possibly we 
have even made sufficient advances beyond the nar· 
row provincialism of us-against-them, so that such 
"merely ethical" considerations might have as 
much force as, or more force than, the strictly reli· 
gious grounds considered valid in past wars and 
past conscriptions. .:. · 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
Conference 
AprillS-20, 1996 
NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
1 was just about the only philosopher at this conference, attended primarily by lawyers and judges 
around the country. The conference opened my eyes to the fact that natural law, which I had primarily 
viewed and taught as a theory, is being applied by members of the legal profession - admittedly a minor-
ity at present - on a daily basis. The conference opened with a paper by David Forte of the Cleveland· 
Marshall College of Law, entitled "The Natural Law Moment." Forte's paper focused on the resurgence 
of interest in natural law in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the Nuremberg trials, and on recent Neo· 
Thomist contributions as well as John Finnis's "phenomenological" contribution to natural law theory. 
The papers presented at this conference were primarily concerned with practical topics; vigorous applica-
tions were made to practical issues - tort reform, privacy issues in individual rights, welfare, divorce, 
pornography, abortion, in vitro fertilization, euthanasia, assisted suicide, workplace safety, school choice, 
homosexuality, sodomy, taxation, the right/duty to work, just-war theory, and many other topics. The 
keynote address was presented by Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., ·or the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, whose panel decision regarding the illegality of a Washington State law concerning as-
sisted suicide had recently been overturned by the majority of the Ninth Circuit Court. 
As I listened to these very interesting papers, 1 began looking for theoretical underpinnings. What I no-
ticed was a strong general influenc~ of the traditional natural law tradition from Aristotle, the Stoics, Augus-
tine and Aquinas, but a more specific influence of John Finnis's natural law theory, a contemporary phe· 
nomenological approach which was frequently cited. On the other hand, not infrequently participants, find· 
ing it difficult to comprehend a natural law theory not based in nature, expressed disagreement with, or 
doubts about, the "self-evidence" of Finnis's non-naturalist revision of Aquinas's natural law theory. Thus 
the ongoing debate between Finnis and Grisez eta/ on the one side, and Henry Veatch and Ralph Mcinerny 
eta/ on the other side came to the fore as a kind of subtext as the conference progressed, with the specter 
of David Hurne's "ought" versus "is" chasm and G. E. Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" hovering over the dis-
cussions. But, bracketing out such theoretical issues temporarily, the conference participants did their real 
work in illustrating the many areas in contemporary jurisprudence where positive law arrives at its limits, 
. so to speak, and almost necessitates natural law considerations where morality and legality intersect. 
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